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INTRODUCTION
Should there be a duty for individuals to come to the res-
cue1 of strangers in peril? This question is beset by complex
and wide ranging problems. The issue of whether a good citi-
zen must also be a "good Samaritan"2 is of significance to a
broad scope of disciplines including philosophers,3 sociolo-
I The term "rescue" is used in this Note in a broad sense, and includes inform-
ing officials of a victim's plight, warning the victijm, actual physical intervention, and
other action appropriate in the circumstances. "Rescue" is defined as an "[a]ct of
freeing or saving," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1175 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); the "act of res-
cuing (especially persons) from enemies, saving from danger or destruction, . . . suc-
cor, deliverance. . . .To deliver or save (a person or thing) from some evil or harm."
THE CoMPAcT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2205 (1971), quoted
in Note, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: The Impact and Potential of the Ver-
mont Approach, 7 VT. L. REv. 143, 143 (1982).
2 The term "good Samaritan" comes from the parable of the Samaritan told by
Jesus:
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among
thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and de-
parted, leaving him half dead.
And by chance there came down a certain priest that way; and when he
saw him, he passed by on the other side.
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on
him, and passed by on the other side.
But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and
when he saw him he had compassion on him,
And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine,
and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of
him.
And on the morrow, when he departed, he took out two pence, and
gave them to the host, and said unto him, "Take care of him; and whatso-
ever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee."
Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbor unto him that
fell among thieves?
And he said, "He that showed mercy on him." Then said Jesus unto
him, "Go, and do thou likewise."
Luke 10:30-37 (King James).
3 For a discussion of the philosophical foundations of a duty to rescue, see
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gists,4 criminologists,5 victimologists, and moralists,7 in addi-
tion to lawyers. The question has been a matter of controversy
for centuries" because it relates to the fundamental role of the
individual in society.9
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 279-92 (1980).
4 See Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in THE GOOD SAMARrrAN AND
THE LAW 171 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samari-
tans, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 183, 195-96 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Zeisel,
An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 209-10 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
For experiments on human behavior in rescue situations, see ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CON-
SEQUENCES (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970); B. LATANE & J. DARLEY, THE
UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970).
' See Formby & Smykla, Citizens Awareness in Crime Prevention: Do They Re-
ally Get Involved?, 9 J. POL. Sci. & An. 398, 401 (1981) ("in general, .. community
awareness and involvement in crime prevention are nonexistent").
There are conflicting explanations for this lack of involvement. Compare Gam-
ble, In Search of a Linkage: Citizen Evaluation, Police Systems Activity and Unre-
ported Crime, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474 (1980) (public attitude toward police is not a
statistically significant determinant of unreported crime) with Norton, Witness In-
volvement in the Criminal Justice System and Intention to Cooperate in Future
Prosecutions, 11 J. CRIM. JUS. 143, 143-44 (1983) (lack of trust and confidence in
police, prosecution and judges, and delay and expense associated with the criminal
justice system are two major factors in a witness' decision whether to cooperate in a
prosecution).
However, studies indicate that community education on reporting techniques,
and the formation of citizens' watch committees have resulted in lower incidents of
crime, and increased reports to the police. See Frinell, Dahlstrom & Johnson, A Pub-
lic Education Program Designed to Increase the Accuracy and Incidence of Citizens'
Reports of Suspicious and Criminal Activities, 8 J. POL. SCI. & An. 160, 164-65
(1980); Latessa & Allen, Using Citizens to Prevent Crime: An Example of Deterrence
and Community Involvement, 8 J. POL. ScI. & An. 69, 73-74 (1980).
6 See Huston, Geis, Wright & Garrett, Good Samaritans as Crime Victims, 1
VICTIMOLOGY 284, 290-91 (1976) (examines how good Samaritan victims differ from
other rrime victims. "Willingness or reluctance to help probably is ingrained by forces
much more powerful than legal enactments."); Note, State Legislation in Aid of Vic-
tims and Witnesses of Crime, 10 J. LEGIS. 394 (1983).
7 See MORALITY AND THE LAW (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HARv. L. REV. 97 (1908); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects
of Good Samaritanship, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 213 (J. Ratcliffe ed.
1966).
' Waller, Rescue and the Common Law: England and Australia, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 141, 156 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
'See Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 51
(1972) ("The lack of such an obligation [to rescue others] is attributed generally to a
regard in the common law for individual freedom and personal responsibility.");
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This Note explores the problem of what can be done by
state statutes to impose a legal duty on persons to aid others.
Recently, several states have enacted, or have considered en-
acting, legislation requiring citizens to render some form of as-
sistance to persons in danger. Kentucky has not introduced
any such legislation at the present time.10 This Note deals
with the concerns that would face Kentucky legislators in de-
ciding whether such statutory action is appropriate. First, the
existing common law on the subject will be discussed. This
involves a study of both criminal and tort law, because failure
to rescue may violate both public and private duties. Next,
legislation requiring persons to report crimes is analyzed. In
this context, the Note explores the drafting of such statutes
and concurrent constitutional problems. Finally, statutes es-
tablishing a duty to "give assistance to others in jeopardy will
be examined. The Note addresses the circumstances which
give rise to a legal duty to act, and discusses whether civil or
criminal liability should be imposed for a failure to act. The
effectiveness of these statutes and the underlying policy con-
siderations are also considered. In conclusion, model statutes
are presented.
I. COMMON LAW ON DUTY TO RESCUE
The undisputed general rule under both the criminal
law"' and tort law12 is that there is absolutely no duty to res-
cue a stranger. This principle has been the subject of scholarly
attack, 3 but it remains firmly entrenched in American law.
Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615, 641 (1942) ("A narrow con-
ception of the duty to assist others has been regarded as the expression of an individ-
ualistic order of society.").
"0 Telephone interview with Norman Lawson of the Kentucky Legislative Re-
search Council (Oct. 19, 1983).
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing:
"Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unac-
companied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law
defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by
law."
12 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1977): "The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or pro-
tection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."
13 See, e.g., B. CARDozo, THE PARADoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928); Ames, supra
1983-84]
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A. Criminal Law
A criminal omission 14 can be defined as a failure to act
where there is a legal duty to act.15 It is axiomatic that a
moral obligation alone is insufficient to impose a legal duty. 6
In the classic case of Jones v. United States," the court found
at least four categories where the failure to act breaches a le-
gal duty.'" First, there is a duty where it is established by
statute. 9 Second, the existence of a duty can be based on cer-
tain status relationships.2 0 Illustrative of relationships giving
rise to such a duty are: parent and child,2' husband and wife,22
ship captain and passenger,23 and employer and employee.24
note 7, at 97; Bohlen, supra note 7, at 217; Bruce, Humanity and the Law, 73 CENT.
L.J. 335 (1911); Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NF. L. REv. 499
(1965), reprinted in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 243 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966);
Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1960).
14 For an excellent general discussion of the law of criminal omissions see WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§ 3-4 (2d ed. 1961); Frankel, Criminal
Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1965); Glazebrook, Criminal
Omissions: The Duty Requirement in Offences Against the Person, 76 L. Q. REv. 386
(1960); Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958); Kirchheimer, Criminal
Omissions, supra note 9, at 615; Perkins, Negative Acts in Criminal Law, 22 IOWA L.
REV. 659 (1937); Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L. REV. 446 (1949).
15 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 172 (14th ed. 1979 & 1983 Supp.). See Hughes,
supra note 14, at 597-99 ("'Act' must be defined before an omission can be distin-
guished; and no agreed juristic concept of an act exists."); Perkins, supra note 14, at
666 (categorizes omissions as negative acts: "An act is (1, positive) an occurrence
which is an exertion of the will manifested in the external world, or (2, negative) a
non-occurrence which involves a breach of a legal duty to take positive action.").
16 W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 26 (1972).
17 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
28 See id. at 310.
20 Id.
20 For a thorough discussion of the relationships giving rise to a duty to act, see
Kirchheimer, supra note 9, at 621-36.
21 See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960) (mother guilty of homicide
for failing to prevent beating of her baby by her lover); Commonwealth v. Breth, 44
Pa. C. 56 (1915) (parents guilty of homicide for failure to call a doctor for their ill
child).
22 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257 (1876) (husband who failed to supply
shelter to his wife was found guilty of manslaughter); Territory v. Manton, 19 P. 387
(Mont. 1888) (husband who left wife out in snow was found guilty of manslaughter
when she froze to death). But see People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907)
(man owes no duty to provide a doctor for his mistress).
23 See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2D 1032 (1963).
24 For a collection of cases see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 16, at 184 n.8.
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In the third type of situation, a responsibility to care for
others may be assumed under contract.25 Finally, a legal obli-
gation may develop from a voluntary assumption of care."6
The historical reluctance of the criminal law to recognize
a general duty of rescue2 7 is often attributed to the difficulty
in defining what inaction is prohibited and to a strong indi-
vidualistic attitude.28 Once a legal duty to act has been estab-
lished,29 a failure to discharge that obligation which results in
the death of the person to whom the duty was owed consti-
tutes murder80 or manslaughter, 1 depending on the circum-
2 See, e.g., Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1880) (manager of children's home
convicted of willfully causing health of a child in his care to be endangered). For a
collection of other cases see Frankel, supra note 14, at 404 n.122.
20 See, e.g., Cornell v. State, 32 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1947) (grandmother found guilty
of manslaughter when she undertook care of grandchild and let it smother to death);
Stehr v. State, 139 N.W. 676 (Neb. 1913) (stepfather guilty of manslaughter for fail-
ure to summon a doctor for his stepchild). For a discussion of this principle under
tort law, see note 49 infra and accompanying text.
'7 Four factors shaped the law of culpable omissions:
(1) judicial reluctance to extend the criminal law into new areas, (2) legisla-
tive and judicial conceptual difficulty in attributing harms to nonaction, (3)
a resulting tendency to inculpate only those omissions where the omitter's
role or status created peculiarly strong expectations that he would act and
(4) the inculpation of omissions only in the face of great and pressing public
need.
Frankel, supra note 14, at 375.
Lord Macaulay, one of the more important influences on the law of criminal
omissions, stated: "We must grant impunity to the vast majority of those omissions
which a benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible, and must content our-
selves with punishing such omissions only when they are distinguished from the rest
by some circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legisla-
tion." L. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in 7 LORD MACAULAY'S WORKS
221, 319-20 (Trevelyan ed. 1873), quoted in HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 190-92 (2d ed. 1960). For discussions on the historical development of the law of
criminal omissions, see generally Glazebrook, supra note 14, at 388-410; Hughes,
supra note 14, at 590-97.
28 Perkins, supra note 14, at 669. To illustrate the difficulty of definition, Perkins
cites the example of a baby who starves to death because no one in the United States
feeds him. Id.
29 The trend under both the criminal and tort law is to broaden the scope of
instances where a duty is imposed. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 16, at 186.
See also Kirchheimer, supra note 9, at 642 (narrow view of situations establishing
duty to act "perhaps itself belongs to a period of the past").
30 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1942) (defendant who intention-
ally failed to rescue girl who fell into a creek after he raped her held guilty of murder
when she drowned).
21 See, e.g., Gibson v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W. 532 (Ky. 1899) (parent who failed
to supply child with shelter held guilty of manslaughter when child died from expo-
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stances.2 Although most of the cases on criminal omissions
relate to homicide, the crime of arson may also be committed
by a failure to act.
33
B. Tort Law
The tort law on omissions3 4 is closely analogous to the
rules developed under the criminal law.35 Even under the
most egregious facts, courts have consistently held that there
is no general duty of rescue.36 For example, in the often cited
sure); Rex v. Russell, [1933] Vict. L.R. 59 (Austl. 1933) (father who watched wife
drown their children held guilty of manslaughter). See also the cases cited in notes
21-26 supra.
82 Whether the failure to act constitutes murder or manslaughter depends on the
defendant's state of mind toward the result. See the discussion of the mens rea re-
quirement for crimes of omission in W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 190.
For a general analysis of homicide offenses resulting from lack of performance of a
duty of care, see Perkins, supra note 14, at 680-83.
33 See Commonwealth v. Cali, 141 N.E. 510 (Mass. 1923).
34 For general discussions of the duty to rescue in tort law, see Bohlen, supra
note 7, at 217; Edgar, The Bystander's Duty and the Law of Torts-An Alternative
Proposal, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 302 (1976); Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad:
The Anglo-American Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23 (J. Ratcliffe ed.
1966); Landes & Posner, Saviors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1978); Weinrib, supra note
3, at 247; Note, The Bad Samaritan: Rescue Reexamined, 54 GEo. L.J. 629 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Bad Samaritan]; Note, The Duty to Aid One in Peril: Good
Samaritan Laws, 15 How. L.J. 672 (1969); Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L.J.
321 (1976). See also the authorities cited in note 13 supra. For a collection of cases on
the duty to render assistance, see Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3D 301 (1971).
38 See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 187 n.24 ("The civil cases
are closely analogous to criminal cases.").
"0 See, e.g., Allen v. Hixson, 36 S.E. 810 (Ga. 1900) (no liability when employer
failed to aid employee who damaged hand in machinery); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59
N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (doctor not liable for refusing to aid a dying man); Osterlind v.
Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (boat concessionaire who rented a boat to an intoxi-
cated man and watched him drown when the boat overturned was not liable); Sidwell
v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955) (no liability when one refrains from preventing
neighbor's child from playing with explosives); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa.
1959) (no liability when defendant watched business visitor drown).
In discussing these cases, one commentator notes that the general rule of no duty
to rescue has been applied by the courts when: "(1) the rescuer must physically inter-
vene to prevent imminent harm to the victim; (2) the rescuer need only warn the
victim to prevent harm; and (3) the rescuer must alleviate a dangerous condition to
prevent harm to unknown potential victims." See Note, supra note 1, at 146.
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case of Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co.,31 a company that
failed to keep a child from walking into a dangerous machine
was found not liable.38 The court stated: "With purely moral
obligations the law does not deal."39 The court suggested an
example in which a person sees a two year old baby on the
railroad tracks; he can easily save the infant with no risk of
danger to himself, but he stands idly by and allows the child
to be killed.4 ° In such a case, the person refusing to act "may,
perhaps justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral mon-
ster; but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or
indictable under the statute for its death.
'41
In discussing these and similar cases, Prosser concludes,
"The remedy in such cases is left to the 'higher law'42 and the
'voice of conscience,' which in a wicked world, would seem to
be singularly ineffective either to prevent the harm or to com-
pensate the victim. Such decisions are revolting to any moral
sense." 43 The traditional justification given for the general
rule precluding liability is the distinction under the tort law
between misfeasance and nonfeasance.44
For recent examples of failure to rescue see Rivera v. Randle E. Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 393 So. 2d 605 (Fla. App. 1980) (ambulance attendants would not come to
the aid of traffic victims); State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981) (bystanders refused
to aid crime victim).
37 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898).
38 Id. at 811.
3 Id. at 810.
40 Cf. Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903) (no liability where rail-
road employees failed to assist man run over by train).
41 44 A. at 809.
"' See Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. at 282 (penalties for failure to come to
the aid of those in need "are found not in the laws of men, but in that higher law, the
violation of which is condemned by the voice of conscience").
43 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 341 (4th ed. 1971).
4, See Bohlen, supra note 7, at 219.
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between ac-
tive misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a
failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from
harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant.
Id.
One commentator's reply to this distinction is that "[firom a philosophical point
of view, it does not appear possible to distinguish between the man who does some-
thing and the man who allows something to be done, when he can interfere." Tunc,
The Volunteer and The Good Samaritan, in THE GOOD SAMARrrAN AND THE LAW 43,
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As with the criminal law, courts have recognized excep-
tions to the general rule where certain special relationships45
create a duty to act." Although there may be no initial duty
to act, if a person gratuitously attempts to render aid,4 7 or
promises to do so,4 he is treated as though he voluntarily as-
45 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
"' See Anderson v. Atchinson, 333 U.S. 821 (1948) (master and servant); Tubbs
v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. App. 1967) (host and invitee); Continental S. Lines,
Inc. v. Robertson, 133 So. 2d 543 (Miss. 1961) (common carrier and passenger); Con-
nelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 37 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1944) (store operator and business
visitor).
One difference between tort law relationships giving rise to a duty to act and the
relationships established under criminal law is that family immunities exist in tort
law. In his analysis of special relationships, Prosser states:
Two that appear likely to receive early recognition are those of husband
and wife, and parent and child, where the duty to aid has been established
in the criminal law, and with the rapidly growing tendency to abrogate fam-
ily immunities to suit may be expected to be taken over into tort cases.
W. PROSSER, supra note 43, at 342.
For an in depth examination of the various relationships which may result in
liability, see Bohlen, supra note 7, at 226-44. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs, § 314A (1977) for a list of these special relationships.
"' In Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), the California Supreme
Court announced a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a legal
duty to third persons exists. These include:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 564. These factors were also cited by the court in Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 310, 311 (Ct. App. 1983). For a discussion of Soldano see text accompanying
notes 53-62 infra. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 29
COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1929) (identifies the relevant factors as administrative, moral or
ethical, economic, justice, preventative and precedential). Green's model is analyzed
in Edgar, supra note 34, at 305-08.
'7 See, e.g., Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R. v. Marrs' Adm'x, 85 S.W. 188 (Ky.
1905); Fagg's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 63 S.W. 580 (Ky. 1901). RESTATEMrr
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1977) states: "One who is required by law to take or
who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive
the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the
other."
4" See Johnson v. Souza, 176 A.2d 797 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1961) (promise to
salt steps); Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 138 A.2d 53, (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1958), rev'd on other grounds, 161 A.2d 479 (N.J. 1960) (promise to call medical
help); Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (promise to confine cat).
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sumed responsibility. 9 In these circumstances, affirmative ac-
tion places the person's conduct within the realm of misfea-
sance and therefore creates tort liability.
C. New Developments
Since the general rule precluding liability for failure to
rescue others is so deeply rooted in the common law, the ques-
tion arises as to the likelihood that courts will ever repudiate
it on their own initiative. Prosser states that the decisions im-
posing liability for breach of a promise to render aid where
there is detrimental reliance by the plaintiff 50 "may possibly
represent the overthrow of the traditional rule."'"
If any such progress in repealing the old common law rule
is underway, it is taking place in the California courts.5 2 Re-
cently the California Court of Appeals reached a landmark de-
cision in Soldano v. O'Daniels.53 In that case, a man came into
the defendant's business establishment, told the defendant's
employee that a person was being threatened in a bar across
4, As to this rule, Prosser notes, "The result of all this is that the good Samari-
tan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the
Levite who pass by on the other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing." W. PROSSER,
supra note 43, at 344. See generally Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty
of Care, 1 DE PAuL L. REV. 30 (1951).
50 For citation to these decisions, see note 48 supra.
5' W. PROSSER, supra note 43, at 346. In addition to such frontal assaults on the
old rule, the common law has developed "techniques for encouraging would-be rescu-
ers." Franklin, supra note 9, at 51. "These include a broad extension of liability to-
ward injured rescuers, whether the defendant has been negligent toward those being
rescued, or is held liable under a doctrine of strict liability.... Moreover, the law
displays a strong unwillingness to find the rescuer to have been contributorily negli-
gent." Id. (citations omitted).
52 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968) (allowing cause of
action against the state for failing to warn foster parents of the dangerous propensi-
ties of their foster child); Morgan v. County of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964) (allowing suit against sheriff who promised to warn decedent before releasing a
dangerous prisoner and failed to do so); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953) (upholding suit against parents for not warning babysitter of their child's vio-
lent tendencies). The most famous California case is Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (therapist liable for failure to warn third person of
patient's violent intentions). For an analysis of California's victims' compensation leg-
islation see Note, California Enacts Legislation to Aid Victims of Criminal Violence,
18 STAN. L. REv. 266 (1965).
Is 190 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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the street, and requested use of the telephone to call the po-
lice. The employee denied the good Samaritan access to the
telephone and refused to place a call himself. The plaintiff's
decedent was killed in the bar as a result of the confrontation
which the good Samaritan was attempting to report, and the
plaintiff sued the business establishment for wrongful death.5
The court held that the defendant's employee owed a duty to
the plaintiff's decedent either to allow the good Samaritan to
place a call to the police or to place the call himself.
5
The court recognized that under traditional analysis the
existence of a duty would be denied, but refused to follow this
approach. "Here there was no special relationship between the
defendant and the deceased. . . .But this does not end the
matter. It is time to re-examine the common law rule of nonli-
ability for nonfeasance in the special circumstances of the in-
stant case."'5' The court emphasized that the old rule had
been the subject of much criticism.5 7 Analyzing the duty ques-
tion in terms of factors previously set forth by the California
Supreme Court,5 the court concluded that harm to the dece-
dent was foreseeable and certain, as there was a close connec-
tion between the employee's conduct and the injury.5 9 The
employee's conduct was morally wrong, the burden on the em-
ployee was minimal, and finding a duty would promote the
policy of harm prevention. In explaining the basis for its
holding,61 the court stated:
The creative and regenerative power of the law has been
strong enough to break chains imposed by outmoded former
decisions. What the courts have power to create, they also
54 Id. at 311-12.
85 See id. at 317.
56 Id. at 314.
57 See id. at 313. The court noted that the California Supreme Court had termed
a similar rule "morally questionable." Id. (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
551 P.2d at 334). For citations to scholarly criticism of such rules, see note 13 supra.
58 These factors are listed in note 46 supra.
5 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
680 Id. at 316.
"' The court stated that the facts of the case almost came within the Restate-
ment of Torts section relating to negligent prevention of aid by third parties, and
relied on provisions of the Restatement throughout the opinion. Id. at 317. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 327 (1979)).
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have power to modify, reject and re-create in response to the
needs of a dynamic society. The exercise of this power is an
imperative function of the courts and is the strength of the
common law. 2
Although it would be unwise to be overly optimistic about
the downfall of the general rule, the Soldano case is one of the
most significant decisions in this regard to date. If other
courts would be as willing to attack the issue outside the rigid
framework of special relationships, emphasizing a customary
tort analysis based on factors such as foreseeability, uncon-
scionable decisions63 would be eliminated. The value of courts'
imposing a duty of rescue, as opposed to state legislatures, is
that courts can be more flexible.64 However, courts need some
impetus to institute change.6 5 This impetus can be provided
by state legislatures.
II. CRIME REPORTING STATUTES
Even though there is no general duty to render assistance
to others, criminal statutes contain a wide range of provisions
punishing specific omissions. For example, "hit-and-run stat-
utes [make] it a criminal offense for the driver of an automo-
bile involved in an accident resulting in injury to leave the
scene of the accident without [stopping], identifying himself
and rendering needed assistance to the injured person.16 6 Un-
61 Id. at 318. However, the court cautiously stressed the limited nature of its
holding. "It bears emphasizing that the duty in this case does not require that one
must go to the aid of another. That is not the issue here. The employee was not the
good samaritan [sic] intent on aiding another. The patron was." Id. at 317.
" See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text for reference to tort law cases
with harsh results.
" "The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are
never set." W. PROSSER, supra note 43, at 3.
5 See Bad Samaritan, supra note 34, at 639. "[J]udicial inertia is such that it is
unreasonable to expect that the courts of their own volition will revise the law of
rescue." Id. The author notes that if such a change were to take place it could be
accomplished in two ways: "The courts can either disregard the misfeasance-nonfea-
sance distinction entirely and apply the rules of prima facie tort to the failure to
rescue, or they can imply a special relationship between men solely because of their
cohabitation in society." Id.
6 Annot. 80 A.L.R.2D 299, 300 (1961). See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001, 20003-
04 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d-40 (Vernon 1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-29 to 41-6-31 (1981). The Kentucky hit and run statute
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like the common law duty of reasonable care, "applicable only
if the. . . accident was caused by the tortious conduct of the
driver involved, '6 7 the duty imposed by statute exists "regard-
less of whether the driver was legally responsible for the
accident."6
Most states also have statutes which require citizens to
aid a police officer on request.69 Additionally, some provisions
obligate persons in certain relationships to furnish care and
necessities.7 0 Persons in certain occupations must conform to
statutory duties. For example, physicians are under a duty to
report cases of child abuse71 or gun shot wounds. 2 Statutes
provides:
The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle. . . is involved in an acci-
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person or resulting only in dam-
age to a vehicle... shall immediately stop... and render reasonable as-
sistance, including the carrying, or making of arrangements for the carrying,
of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical
treatment....
Ky. REv. STAT. § 189.580(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. For ci-
tations to further statutes, see Gregory, supra note 34, at 29 n.18.
67 Annot., supra note 66, at 300. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 322 (1934):
If the actor by his tortious conduct has caused such bodily harm to another
as to make him helpless, the actor is under a duty to use reasonable care to
prevent any further harm which the actor then realizes or should realize as
threatening the other. Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to the
existence or nonexistence of a similar duty to aid or protect one whom the
actor's non-tortious conduct has rendered helpless to aid or protect himself.
This caveat was later deleted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965). See
generally Note, Nonnegligent Driver's Duty to Warn, 43 TENN. L. REv. 511 (1976)
(discussing common law duty of motorist involved in an accident that leaves a hazard
on the highway to take action to warn oncoming motorists).
88 See Annot., supra note 66, at 300-01.
6 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2403 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1241 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-8 (Smith-Hurd 1977). See generally Legisla-
tion Note, Criminal Law: Requiring Citizens to Aid a Police Officer, 14 DE PAUL L.
REv. 159 (1964). Forty-six states have provisions requiring citizens to come to the aid
of a police officer on his request; 42 states impose sanctions for failure to do so. Id. at
160-61. These penalties range from a nominal fine to as much as a $1,000 fine. Some
states make refusal to assist a misdemeanor. See also Frankel, supra note 14, at 402-
05 (crimes of omission are categorized).
70 For citations to some of these statutes, see Frankel, supra note 14, at 403,
nn.108-09. See 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 15, at § 173 for a concise
discussion and extensive citation to case law regarding the duty to provide food,
clothing and shelter.
71 See Frankel, supra note 14, at 403. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-74
(West 1982 & Supp. 1982). KRS § 208B.030(1) provides that certain, specified health
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may mandate reporting specific acts of misconduct, such as
the attempt to influence jurors73 or an offer of a bribe to par-
ticipants in sporting events.74 When such statutory duties are
added to those that exist under the common law, it becomes
clear that a mere statement of the general "no duty" rule is
misleading. The real issue is what should be done about "per-
sons placed by fortuity in emergency situations who fail to aid
others in distress.
'7 5
A. The Catalyst for Recent Legislative Action
Rhode Island recently enacted a crime reporting statute,6
and similar legislation has been introduced in Massachu-
setts, 7  and Pennsylvania. 78 All three legislative efforts basi-
cally state that any person who witnesses one of the specified
crimes must notify the police that a crime has been
committed.79
practitioners, or any "other person, organization or agency who knows or has reasona-
ble cause to believe that a child is an abused or neglected child, shall cause a report
to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section." KRS § 208B.030(2)-(8)
then sets forth detailed requirements as to the nature of the report and subsequent
proceedings.
72 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (Page 1982) [hereinafter cited as ORCA]
(relating to duty to report gun shot or stab wounds and other injuries).
73 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-145 (West 1960), which provides: "Any person
having knowledge" of an attempt to improperly influence jurors "who does not at
once give information thereof to the presiding judge of the court . . .or to some
prosecuting officer, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned
not more than one year or both."
74 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 29-3 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (any person connected
with a sporting contest who fails to report the offer of a bribe is guilty of a class A
misdeameanor).
The text accompanying notes 69-74 does not provide an exhaustive list of the
situations where a person has the duty to act. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 403-04.
Other examples include: the obligation of hotel owners to maintain fire equipment
and the duty of pharmacists to keep a poison registry. For citation to such statutes,
see id. at 403 nn.110-14.
' Frankel, supra note 14, at 405. Frankel refers to this type of person as "the
fortuitously villainous omitter." Id.
71 1983 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 TO 11-37-3.4 [hereinafter cited as R.I.G.L.].
7 See Mass. H.B. 5961, 1983 Sess.
78 See Pa. H.B. 1114, 1983 Sess.
7, R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1 states:
Any person other than the victim, who knows or has reason to know
that a first degree sexual assault is taking place in his/her presence shall
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These crime reporting measures were introduced in direct
response to a recent rape case in New Bedford, Massachu-
setts.80 According to reports, on March 6, 1983, a young wo-
man was raped repeatedly in a bar by four men while at least
fifteen other men stood by and watched;81 some applauded
and cheered, but no one called the police.s2 The mass indiffer-
ence was verbalized by orie, unidentified witness who stated:
"Why should I care?"s
immediately notify the state police department of the city or town in which
said assault or attempted assault is taking place of said crime.
Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77, provides:
Whoever witnesses the commission of a felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment and fails voluntarily to report said crime to the local police
within twenty-four hours, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand
dollars.
Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 78, states that a person commits an offense if "[h]e fails to
report to police, within 24 hours of its commission, a murder, rape, kidnapping, rob-
bery or arson which he has observed being committed and which he knows during its
commission, or learns within 24 hours of its commission, is a crime."
80 See the description of this case in Clendenin, Barroom Rape Shames Town of
Proud Heritage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
81 There were accounts that the district attorney charged two "witnesses" in the
case, but they "reportedly encouraged the attack and helped hold the woman on a
pool table." Press, Taylor & Clausen, The Duties of a Bystander, NEwswEEK, Mar.
28, 1983, at 101:79.
Sentencing of the defendants in the New Bedford rape case took place on March
26, 1984. Massachusetts Superior Court Justice William Young sentenced three of the
defendants to maximum prison terms of 9 to 12 years. The fourth defendant con-
victed of aggravated rape received a six to eight year prison term. Two other men
indicted, in the case were acquitted upon evidence that they had not actually partici-
pated in the rape, although they had watched and encouraged the perpetrators. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1984, p. 6.
82 See The Tavern Rape: Cheers and No Help, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1983, at
101:25 [hereinafter cited as The Tavern Rape]. .
" Clendenin, supra note 80, at A16, col. 1 (quoting the New Bedford Standard
Times). The Times also noted that when police returned to the bar later that night,
two of the victim's alleged assailants were still there, and the bar had been open for
business the entire time. Id.
Such reports fueled the national outrage over the incident. Approximately 2,500
people took part in a candlelight procession in New Bedford one week after the at-
tack. One protestor was quoted as saying "[They should take every one of those
guys who were there cheering and fine them $1,000 apiece... ." Id. at A16, col. 2.
These sentiments were echoed by magazine and newspaper editors throughout
the country. See, e.g., Violence and the Social Fabric, AmEmCA, Apr. 2, 1983, at
148:251-52 ("It is the kind of atrocity that strikes sharply at the national conscious-
ness and stirs feelings of revulsion and outrage miles from the scene of the assault,
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When she introduced the Rhode Island bill before the
senate, State Senator Gloria Kennedy Fleck expressed con-
cern over the state of the law which would allow witnesses in
situations such as the New Bedford rape to escape prosecu-
tion with impunity.84 She stated: "In Rhode Island, rape is
not a spectator sport but a criminal offense. We, in Rhode Is-
land, recognize the seriousness of such an offense by being the




Before crime reporting bills are passed, potentially com-
plex issues must be carefully considered. The problems en-
countered in the recent legislation, particularly the Rhode Is-
land statute, demonstrate the pitfalls of drafting laws in a
"knee-jerk" response to a particular incident.8 "
1. Scope
The initial drafting problem is to determine the range of
crimes subject to the reporting duty. The Rhode Island stat-
ute is the most narrow legislation in this regard, since it ap-
plies only to a "first degree sexual assault or attempted first
degree sexual assault.8s7 This establishes an unduly restricted
scope; other serious crimes pose an equally dangerous threat
to society.
Ohio's crime reporting statutes8 has the broadest reach,
among people with no possible connection to the victim .... ).
See 103 RHODE ISLAND SENATE JOURNAL, App. 22 (Apr. 13, 1983) (remarks of
Sen. Fleck) [hereinafter cited as R.I.S.J.]. The senator asked law enforcement officials
and the Rhode Island Attorney General if witnesses like those in the New Bedford
rape could be prosecuted. Upon learning that such prosecution was "probably not"
feasible, she introduced the Rhode Island bill. See id.
85 Id.
80 "The problem with the bill was that it was really rushed through the legisla-
ture and got very little comprehensive attention." Telephone interview with Steven
Brown, Executive Director of the Rhode Island American Civil Liberties Union (Nov.
16, 1983).
87 R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1.
88 ORCA § 2921.22.
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making the failure to report any felony a crime.89 The Massa-
chusetts bill is more limited, mandating the reporting of any
"felony punishable by death or life imprisonment."90 Unfortu-
nately, neither statute provides sufficient guidance to the wit-
ness. The duty should be readily ascertainable from the face
of the statute.9 Unless it is known before hand whether the
crime witnessed is a felony or a felony subject to certain pun-
ishment, it is impossible to be certain of the reporting respon-
sibility. Ideally, a crime reporting statute should specifically
list the applicable crimes. Such a method is used in the Penn-
sylvania bill, which sets forth a duty to report any "murder,
rape, kidnapping, robbery or arson."92
A second scope issue concerns who should be subject to a
reporting duty. The Rhode Island statute and the proposed
legislation in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania require an in-
dividual to report a crime only if it has taken place in his or
her presence.9 3 This limitation is a result of drafting the stat-
utes in response to the specific problem raised by the New
Bedford rape, where witnesses to a violent crime failed to re-
port it. 4 The myopia reflected in these statutes creates an un-
necessarily narrow approach to the crime reporting duty.
Since knowledge of the commission of a specified crime is an
element of the offense, 5 the responsibility to inform police
should be extended to any person who subsequently learns
that a crime has taken place. The Ohio statute, for example,
simply requires knowledge that a felony has been or is being
committed. 6
" The Ohio statute provides in part: "No person, knowing that a felony has been
or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report such information to law enforce-
ment authorities." ORCA § 2921.22.
o Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77.
9' For a discussion of the constitutional problem raised by vague statutes see
notes 134-37 infra and accompanying text.
92 See Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 78.
91 See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1; Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77; Pa. H.B. 1114, supra
note 78. See note 79 supra for the text of these statutes.
9' See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the New Bed-
ford incident.
95 See, e.g., R.I.G.L. § 11037-3.1. See notes 101-11 infra and accompanying text
for analysis of the knowledge requirement.
98 See ORCA § 2921.22.
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Finally, a crime reporting statute should clearly exempt a
rape victim from the statutory duties of a witness. Both the
Rhode Island statute and the Massachusetts bill contain such
a provision. 7
2. Reporting Requirements
It is essential that a crime reporting statute set forth suf-
ficient guidelines regarding the reporting duty. A specific time
limit within which crimes must be reported should be stated.
The Rhode Island statute is insufficient in this regard because
it only requires that notification take place "immediately."98
The Pennsylvania and Massachusetts proposals take the bet-
ter approach of requiring disclosure of a crime within twenty-
four hours of its commission.99
Additionally, a statute should explicitly provide that
knowledge of the commission of a crime is required before any
notification responsibility arises. The Rhode Island and Ohio
statutes, and the Pennsylvania bill, each contain such a provi-
sion.100 "Knowledge" in this context relates to an awareness of
the circumstances giving rise to the duty, as opposed to the
existence of a law establishing such a duty.1' 1 As usual, igno-
rance of the law generally is not a defense, 102 but ignorance of
97 The Rhode Island statute's reporting requirement applies to "any person,
other than the victim." R.I.G.A. § 11-37-3.1. Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77, states,
"For the purpose of this section, a victim of rape shall not be considered a witness."
98 See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1.
9' See Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77; Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 78.
100 The Rhode Island statute requires reporting by one "who knows or has reason
to know" of a first degree sexual assault. R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1. The Ohio statute pro-
vides that a person shall not "knowingly fail to report" a felony, "knowing" that it
"has been or is being committed." ORCA § 2921.22(A). The bill introduced in Penn-
sylvania proscribes failure to report one of the listed felonies which a person "knows",
within twenty-four hours. Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 78.
101 See HALL, supra note 27, at 205 (a person does not actually have to know that
he is under a legal duty to act, but he must "know the facts to which his duty refers
as well as the facts which make it necessary to perform the duty."); Hughes, supra
note 14, at 611 (the question is "the defendant's knowledge of the physical circum-
stances which gear the duty, not knowledge of the duty itself").
101 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 188. But see Lambert v. Cali-
fornia, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957). The Supreme Court reversed a conviction of a person
violating an obscure municipal ordinance requiring registration of convicted felons on
the grounds that it violated due process of law. The Court stated that ignorance of
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the relevant circumstances should constitute a defense to a
charge under one of the crime reporting statutes.10 3
Under the Rhode Island statute, the knowledge require-
ment is embodied in the phrase, "knows or has reason to
know.' 10 4 Thus, either actual or constructive knowledge can
provide the basis for violation of the reporting duty.105 Signifi-
cantly, the use of constructive knowledge permits proof of
awareness by circumstantial evidence. 06 This is a welcome ex-
tension because the failure to report under the statutes will
often occur without any affirmative conduct which would al-
low an inference as to the actor's state of mind.1
07
If such legislation contains no reference to knowledge, the
courts should imply this requirement. 08 As the Kentucky
Court of Appeals observed in Westrup v. Commonwealth,0 9
"One cannot be said in any manner to neglect or refuse to
the law is excusable when "circumstances which might move one to inquire [of the
existence of such a law] are completely lacking." Id. However, LaFave finds that in
the cases involving a duty to rescue "[t]he Lambert defense would most likely not be
available." W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 188.
"' See Perkins, supra note 14, at 677-78.
10 See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.1.
101 Actual knowledge connotes subjective awareness, while constructive knowl-
edge is based on what a reasonable person would be aware of under the circum-
stances. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 28, at 195-98 for a general
discussion of the degrees of knowledge.
108 See Note, supra note 1, at 172 (different definitions of knowledge impose va-
rying burdens of proof). For instance, in the New Bedford rape case, if it could be
demonstrated that a bystander was present in the tavern, and had watched the rape,
and that the victim suffered evident physical injury, then the necessary mental state
would be established in a jurisdiction allowing constructive knowledge.
107 See Frankel, supra note 14, at 395 (some omitters might be "aware of the
consequences of their failure to act but others would not and our determination of
what was in their minds would be so highly speculative as to make the imposition of
sanctions undesirable").
108 Several courts have read a knowledge requirement into statutes. See, e.g.,
Scott v. State, 233 S.W. 1097 (Tex. 1921).
The word "knowingly" or "knowing" does not appear in the description
of the act denounced as an offense, and it is not necessary for the state to
so allege. If it becomes an issue on the trial, lack of knowledge on the part
of a defendant that he had injured some one would excuse him and be a
defense to a prosecution. ...
Id. at 1100. See also People v. Henry, 72 P.2d 915, 921 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937);
People v. Rallo, 6 P.2d 516, 520 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Herchenbach v. Common-
wealth, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Va. 1946).
109 93 S.W. 646 (Ky. 1906).
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perform a duty unless he has knowledge of the condition of
things which require performance at his hands."'110
An additional consideration with crime reporting statutes
involves the order of prosecution. There are potentially "seri-
ous speedy trial problems" if the witness cannot be prose-
cuted until after the alleged felon's trial."' A statutory provi-
sion permitting the witness to be tried first could alleviate the
problem. Although the prosecution would be required to prove
commission of the underlying crime in order to establish its
case against the witness, this burden is no greater than that
presently imposed in cases of accomplice liability." 2 At least
in most states, the witness could be convicted even if the al-
leged felon was subsequently acquitted.""
Statutes should address whether a witness could be pros-
ecuted for failure to report, despite his or her subsequent co-
operation in the criminal defendant's trial. The Massachusetts
proposal authorizes suspension of any penalty in this situa-
tion. 1 4 Such provisions are desirable because they give the
prosecution leverage in convincing the witness to testify at
trial, and allow for flexible treatment of the witness's case if
cooperation is shown.
In addition, a statute should specify situations that would
justify a witness's failure to comply with the reporting man-
date," 5 as in the case of certain privileged relationships. The
Ohio statute is the only legislation that addresses this prob-
110 Id. at 648.
" Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen? 69 A.B.A.J. 1208, 1208 (Sept. 1983) (quoting
Steven Brown, Executive Director Rhode Island ACLU); Telephone interview with
Steven Brown, supra note 86. For this and other reasons, the Rhode Island ACLU
opposes the legislation. See id.
il For a general discussion of procedural problems in accomplice liability cases,
see W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 63, at 498-501.
" See id. at 501. LaFave notes, however, that "the rule requiring internal con-
sistency in a verdict may bar acquittal of the principal and conviction of an accessory
in a single trial." Id.
1' Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77 states: "Voluntary testimony for the state by
said witness in any prosecution against the accused felon shall authorize the court to
waive his or her fine."
11 In reporting the New Bedford rape case, Newsweek magazine stated: "Many
of those present said they were too scared to call for help." The Tavern Rape, supra
note 82, at 101:25. Obviously, a defense based on fear would have to be very cau-
tiously limited or it would destroy any vitality of the rule.
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lem. It provides a detailed list of privileges, including those
based on relationship, such as attorney and client, doctor and
patient, psychologist and patient, priest and penitent, and
husband and wife.116 Disclosure is also excused if it tends to
incriminate a member of the actor's immediate family,
17
reveals a confidential news source, s18 violates a confidential
communication to a clergyman,119 or relates to persons in au-
thorized drug treatment 120 or counseling programs."'
Finally, a statute should have a provision immunizing
from any civil or criminal liability persons who make a good
faith report pursuant to the statute. 2  This would serve to en-
courage reporting as well as to protect witnesses.123
3. Penalties
A third issue which must be faced in drafting a crime re-
porting statute is the appropriate level of sanctions to be im-
posed upon violation of the law. The Pennsylvania bill con-
tains the most stringent penalties, with the potential of a
seven year prison term. 2 4 One explanation given for the se-
verity of the penalties is that such measures are justified in
outrageous situations like the New Bedford rape case. 25
11 ORCA § 2921.22(E)(1).
117 ORCA § 2921.22(E)(2).
"a ORCA § 2921.22(E)(3).
219 ORCA § 2921.22(E)(4).
120 ORCA § 2921.22(E)(5).
221 ORCA § 2921.22(E)(6).
122 See, e.g., R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.4. In the original bill as it was introduced, there
was no provision requiring a complaint by the victim for charges to be brought, or a
provision immunizing reporters from liability. According to the journal of the senate,
the bill had been amended before it was passed on April 18, 1983. See 103 R.IJ.S.
(calendar).
12 For a discussion of statutes limiting the civil liability of rescuers, see notes
188-89 infra and accompanying text.
124 Under the Pennsylvania bill, if the witness knows that the crime committed
would constitute a first or second degree felony, then failure to report it would be a
felony of the third degree. Otherwise, it constitutes a misdemeanor of the second de-
gree. See Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 79. A third degree felony is punishable by a
maximum of seven years imprisonment. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(b)(4) (Purdon
1982) [hereinafter cited as PCSA]. A second degree misdemeanor is punishable by a
maximum of two years imprisonment. 18 PCSA § 106(b)(7).
125 Telephone interview with Pennsylvania state senator Marianne Arty (Nov.
17, 1983).
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In contrast, the Colorado statute is merely a moral state-
ment that persons who believe that a crime has been commit-
ted should report it to the police.12 6 Since no penalty is im-
posed for failure to comply with this obligation, the statute
serves no purpose. Those who possess such a refined con-
science as to take a reporting duty seriously would be uninflu-
enced by this legislative pronouncement, and those who do
not are unlikely to be stirred from their apathy by a moral
comment with no sanctions.
The penalty attached to a reporting violation should re-
flect the purpose sought to be served. If the goal is no more
than providing good words to live by, then sanctions are not
warranted; but if the aim is to enforce the duty to report
crimes, then some penalty must be imposed. However, too
harsh a punishment will hamper prosecution efforts, because a
jury may be unwilling to sentence a person who took no action
to a lengthy prison term. The best solution would be a com-
promise between the Pennsylvania bill and the Colorado stat-
ute, like those sanctions found in both the Massachusetts
bill 127 and the Rhode Island statute.121 Such a moderate pen-
alty structure gives force to the law, while encouraging
prosecutions.
One difficulty in relation to the statutory penalties should
be observed. All the statutes under consideration make the
failure to report a crime a misdemeanor. 129 If the relevant law
of the jurisdiction allows for misdemeanor-manslaughter
convictions, 30 then in the event that a crime victim died as a
proximate result of the failure to report, the witness could be
12' COLo. Rav. STAT. § 18-8-115 (1973 & Supp. 1982) ("It is the duty of every
corporation or person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed to report promptly the suspected crime to law enforcement authorities.").
117 See Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77 (imposes a fine of one hundred to one
thousand dollars).
11 See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.3 (allows for a maximum sentence of one year in
prison, or a five hundred dollar fine, or both).
.1. See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.3; ORCA § 2921.22(G); Mass. H.B. 5961, supra note 77;
Pa. H.B. 1114, supra note 78.
" See, e.g., ORCA § 2903.04(B): "No person shall cause the death of another as
a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misde-
meanor." See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, at 545-61 for discussion of the
analogous concept of felony murder.
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charged with manslaughter. 13 1 This problem could be elimi-
nated by changing the statutory classification in states retain-
ing misdemeanor-manslaughter offenses.
C. Constitutional Problems
The central problem with crime reporting statutes is their
potential vulnerability to constitutional attack under the
"void for vagueness" doctrine. 13 2 Under this concept, a crimi-
nal statute will be declared void if there is impermissible un-
certainty as to the meaning of its terms. 33 This indefiniteness
can relate to the scope of the statute, the conduct forbidden,
or the penalty imposed.134 Such a proscription is necessary be-
cause if citizens cannot clearly evaluate whether certain con-
duct is criminal, the state is given arbitrary power over
prosecutions. 35
1. Similarity to Misprision of Felony
The inaction prohibited under a crime reporting statute
is similar to the common law crime of misprision of felony.
1"1 Interview with Prof. Sarah Welling, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky (Nov. 9, 1983).
1"2 The void for vagueness doctrine derives in state courts from the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, at 83-84.
133 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (criminal statute is
unconstitutionally vague when "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application"); Freund, The Supreme Court and
Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 541 (1951) ("The objection of vagueness is two-
fold: inadequate guidance to the individual whose conduct is regulated, and inade-
quate guidance to the triers of fact."). See generally Aigler, Legislation in Vague or
General Terms, 21 MCH. L. Rev. 831 (1922-23); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncer-
tainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1954-55); Note, The Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
134 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 16, at 84. LaFave cites three factors con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in ruling on a vagueness question: (1) notice; (2) pro-
tection against discriminatory enforcement; and (3) breathing space for first amend-
ment rights. See id. at 85-89.
131 See Allen, Misprision, 78 L. Q. Rev. 40, 60 (1962) (misprision laws leave too
much "'quasi-judicial' discretion to the police"); Frankel, supra note 14, at 425
(when a criminal statute is overly vague there is "danger that overzealous police and
prosecutors will initiate action against him [the person violating the statute] for con-
duct he could not have known was criminal"). See, e.g., Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399 (1966); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
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Misprision of felony has been defined as "a failure to report or
prosecute a known felon." 136 Conviction of this misdemeanor
would not lie if the person's assistance to the felon was suffi-
cient to make him an accessory. 37 Legal writers debate
whether the offense even existed at common law, 3 s but most
courts have conceded at least a theoretical historical basis for
the charge. 39
Discussing the duties of a bystander in regard to a crime,
Newsweek stated that after the New Bedford rape the district
attorney "considered dusting off an old common-law crime
known an 'misprision of a felony'," but that there were "tech-
iical problems with that charge. '140 Judicial attitude toward
this crime is evidenced by the statement of Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Marbury v. Brooks:14 ' "It may be the duty of a citizen
to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which
comes to his knowledge; but the law which would punish him
in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for
man." 142 .One commentator has stated that there is only one
reported conviction for misprision of felony in America, and
this took place in 1878.'3
136 W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 62 (although it has been said that
the crime also included a failure to prevent the commission of a felony, this view is
incorrect). Contra State v. Biddle, 124 A. 804, 805 (Del. 1923) (defining misprision of
felony as "the criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being committed or to
bring the offender to justice after its commission, but without such previous concert
with or subsequent assistance of him as will make the concealer an accessory before
or after the fact.") (emphasis added) quoting State v. Wilson, 67 A. 533 (Vt. 1907)).
For extensive analysis of misprision crimes see Allen, supra note 135, at 40;
Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context, 52 A.B.A. J. 148
(1966); Howard, Misprisions, Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 CRIM. L. REV.
750 (1959); Comment, Misprision of Felony: A Reappraisal, 23 EMORY L.J. 1095
(1974); Comment Misprision of Felony: A Crime Whose Time Has Come, Again, 28
U. FLA. L. Rav. 199 (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Misprision of Felony].
137 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 526.
135 See 2 H. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 238 (1883). See
also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 16, at 526 ("It is doubtful whether this of-
fense ever had a meaningful existence beyond the textbook writers."); see also
Goldberg supra note 136, at 148.
Ms' See the authorities cited in Misprision of Felony, supra note 136, at 200, n.7.
14 See The Tavern Rape, supra note 82, at 101:79.
1.1 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 325 (1822).
141 Id. at 334.
141 See Frankel, supra note 14, at 417, n.170 ("The only reported American con-
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It seems clear that misprision of felony has been generally
repudiated, at least as it was broadly defined at common
law."' In the cases which have acknowledged continued vital-
ity in the offense, its parameters have been strictly limited by
imposing additional elements such as criminal intent and af-
firmative action.145 There is a federal misprision of felony
statute,146 but is has been interpreted so that mere silence
without some positive act of concealment is an insufficient ba-
sis for a conviction. 47
The basic flaw with misprision of felony as it existed at
common law was its vagueness. 48 Modern crime reporting
statutes must eliminate this problem if they are to withstand
constitutional scrutiny under the void for vagueness doc-
trine.149 Thus, they should be drafted as narrowly as possible.
In particular, limiting liability to those situations where the
viction of misprision of felony which the writer has been able to find was under a
New Jersey statute in State v. Hann, 40 N.J.L. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1878).").
However, more recently a person was convicted of this crime in England for his
actions in connection with the sale of stolen guns, in the leading case of Sykes v.
Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528 (H.L. 1962). For critical analysis of
this case, see Glazebrook, How Long Then Is the Arm of the Law to Be?, 25 MOD. L.
REv. 301, 317 (1962).
'" See, e.g., Holland v. State, 302 So.2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1974) (misprision of felony
repudiated as an offense in Florida); People v. Lefkovitz, 293 N.W. 642 (Mich. 1940)
(misprision was "wholly unsuited to American criminal law and procedure as used in
this State").
145 See People v. Garnett, 61 P. 1114 (Cal. 1900); State v. Michaud, 114 A.2d 352
(Me. 1955); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 61 N.E.2d 849 (Mass. 1945); State v. Wilson, 67
A. 553 (Vt. 1907).
146 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) provides:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
147 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. Worces-
ter, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1960).
148 See Misprision of Felony, supra note 136, at 202 n.17 ("Nearly all legal writ-
ers, whether in favor of or opposed to misprision laws, have indicated that the vague-
ness of the crime is its most serious defect."). In addition to the authorities cited in
note 136 supra, see Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 751 n.175 (1937) (the traditional rule denying criminal liability
for the failure to act absent special circumstances "rests upon the ground that no
broader rule can be formulated which is not too indefinite as a measure of liability").
149 See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this doctrine.
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witness has "knowledge" of the crime 50 goes a long way to-
ward eliminating uncertainty, because the relevant law of each
jurisdiction will define what constitutes "knowledge."' 151
2. Selective Prosecution
Under the Rhode Island statute, no person can be
charged with violating the duty to report unless the police de-
partment investigating the crime obtains a signed complaint
from the victim alleging a crime. 5 2 Since each victim retains
sole discretion as to whether "his" witnesses will be charged,
the statute allows selective prosecution. 53 Arguably, this vio-
lates the principle of generality, which requires that like cases
should be treated alike.5 4 The potential for arbitrary enforce-
ment thus renders the statute unconstitutionally vague.
55
Moreover, the provision serves no useful function. If it is
intended to give the victim control over the prosecution, as a
practical matter this is not needed. Conviction of the witness,
like conviction of the alleged rapist, would be virtually impos-
sible without the victim's cooperation. 56 Thus, because of the
provision's constitutional defect and lack of utility, a rule re-
quiring a complaint from the victim should be stricken from
150 See notes 101-111 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the knowl-
edge requirement.
151 Kentucky follows the Model Penal Code definition of "knowingly." "A person
acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the
circumstance exists." KRS § 501.020(2) (1975 & 1982 Supp.). The state of mind es-
sential for "knowledge" is awareness. Lawson, Kentucky Penal Code: The Culpable
Mental States and Related Matters, 61 Ky. L.J. 657, 663 (1972-73). In Kentucky
knowledge of the facts or circumstances can be based on personal information or on
information provided by others, butnot on suspicion and deliberate avoidance of in-
formation related to that suspicion. Id. at 664-65.
151 See R.I.G.L. § 11-37-3.2 ("No person shall be charged under section 11-37-3.1
unless and until the police department investigating the incident obtains from the
victim a signed complaint against said person alleging a violation of section 11-37-
3.1.").
M Telephone interview with Dorothy Lohmann, board member, Rhode Island
Rape Crisis Center (Nov. 16, 1983).
'5' See Frankel, supra note 14, at 426.
151 See LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 16, at 87-88 for a discussion of the arbi-
trary enfordement problem.
I" Telephone interview with Dorothy Lohmann, supra note 153.
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any crime reporting statute.
D. Policy Considerations
The Rhode Island Rape Crisis Center opposes the state's
recent legislation for various reasons. First, the victim may
lose control over the situation because she "might be unwill-
ingly coerced into being a state's witness. ' 15 Second, police
investigation into the victim's personal life, based on suspi-
cions that a failure to report a crime had taken place, could
unduly violate the victim's privacy.' 5 Lastly, if the witness's
trial takes place before that of the alleged rapist, the victim
must appear in court twice, and this is burdensome and
unrealistic.
59
Dealing with these objections clearly involves a balancing
of interests. On the one hand are the rightful concerns for the
victim's privacy, convenience, and control over the prosecu-
tion. This must be weighed against society's interest in pun-
ishing persons who witness serious crimes such as rape and
fail to report them to the police, and the ultimate increased
protection afforded to rape victims as a result of the statute.
On balance, the benefits of the legislation should outweigh the
personal sacrifices which may be required of the individual
victim.
III. STATUTES IMPOSING A DUTY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE
Vermont was the first state to enact legislation establish-
ing.a duty to rescue strangers in peril. 60 The statute requires:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be ren-
157 Id.
158 Id. See Kiesel, supra note 111, at 1209.
159 Telephone interview with Dorothy Lohmann, supra note 153. Ms. Lohmann
said that it is already very difficult to get rape victims to prosecute their assailants. If
the process was doubly burdensome, it would make efforts to control rape that much
harder. Additionally, she speculated that prosecuting the witness first would serve to
the alleged rapist's advantage, because his defense counsel could determine how the
victim performed under the pressures of trial. Id.
160 See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519 (1972 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
VSA].
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dered without danger or peril to himself or without interfer-
ence with important duties to others, give reasonable assist-
ance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others.' 6 '
Minnesota recently adopted a statute which is basically simi-
lar to this provision.162 In contrast to this limited amount of
legislation in the United States, many European countries
have criminal statutes imposing a duty of rescue .1 6  Thus, a
complete analysis of the problems involved with such legisla-
tion should make reference to the European statutes as well
as the American laws.
A. Statutory Requirements
As with the crime reporting legislation, vagueness is a
central problem in statutes that impose a duty to render
assistance.16 4 Persons must have fair notice of what acts or
omissions are prohibited under the law.16 5 With the Vermont
'V' VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
261 The statute provides:
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is
exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he
can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include ob-
taining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
personnel.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05(1) (West 1984) [hereinafter cited as MSA]. Violation of
the statute is a petty misdemeanor, which is defined as "a petty offense which is
prohibited by statute, which does not constitute a crime and for which a sentence of a
fine of not more than $100 may be imposed." MSA § 609.02(4)(a).
,'3 For excellent discussions of the duty to rescue under European legal systems,
see Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND
THE LAW 63 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Com-
parative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 630 (1965-66); Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 10 ALBERTA L. REv.
89 (1972); Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Tunc, supra note 44, at 43; Note,
The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952); Note,
Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the Duty to Rescue,
1976 UTAH L. REV. 529.
"' See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text for analyses of vagueness
under the crime reporting statutes.
115 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoT, supra note 16, at 85-87 for analysis of the notice
concept. See also the authorities cited in note 133 supra. One commentator has noted
that problems of vagueness in the context of criminal omissions are heightened by the
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and Minnesota statutes, the meanings of many elements of
the offense are uncertain.
A statute should clearly state what type of danger an in-
dividual must be in before a duty of rescue arises. The Ver-
mont and Minnesota statutes are not sufficiently definite as to
this matter, simply providing that the person must be "ex-
posed to grave physical harm. ' 16 6 Arguably, an alcoholic un-
conscious in the gutter is exposed to such harm, but probably
no one would contend that the drafters of the statute in-
tended it to apply in this kind of situation.
More definite guidelines must be established. For exam-
ple, some European statutes provide that the responsibility of
rescue only exists when there is "sudden and imminent dan-
ger to human life. ' 167 In addition to this language, the term
"involuntary" should be included, so that the fortuitous na-
ture of the circumstances would be emphasized.
Additionally, American statutes do not adequately specify
the immediacy and degree of risk which will abrogate the duty
to aid others. They state that rescue is excused where action
would cause "danger or peril to himself [the potential rescuer]
or interfere with important duties owed to others."1 8 Since
the possibility of peril to the rescuer is present in most emer-
gencies, more guidance should be given as to the nature of the
risk. In European countries, the degree of risk necessary to
relieve the potential rescuer of any duty ranges from an ex-
treme of only danger to the individual's life, to serious danger
to him or others, to the other extreme allowing non-compli-
ance with the statute when any risk to the rescuer is
"aura effect." See Frankel, supra note 14, at 426. Under this theory, the state will
regulate conduct to an inacceptable degree because, due to the indefiniteness of the
statutory terms, persons "bordering on the fringe of criminality" will obey the law
rather than run the risk of its punishment. Id. This is a matter of particular concern
in cases involving first amendment rights. See the authorities cited in note 133 supra.
166 MSA § 604.05(1); VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
167 See Rudzinski, supra note 163, at 96. The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark,
Poland and Czechoslovakia limit the duty of rescue to such cases. Other countries,
including Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and Hungary extend the duty to
"any serious danger to bodily integrity and health." Id. at 98. Portugal limits the
rescue obligation to third party attack. Id. at 99.




The Minnesota statute also requires that the person be
"at the scene of an emergency" before he must render aid.Y
Such a negative definition is frankly useless, as it does nothing
to state what is the "scene of an emergency," but merely what
is not. "
A statute imposing a duty to render assistance should
also describe the standard under which a rescuer's actions
shall be judged. Both the Vermont and Minnesota statutes
use the standard that rescuers must give "reasonable assist-
ance."' 17 The Minnesota statute elaborates on this point by
stating that reasonable assistance "may include obtaining or
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
personnel.' 7 2 In the European countries, the form of assist-
ance required ranges from personal intervention or obtaining
help from others, to only personal intervention, to statutes
giving the potential rescuer a choice of giving aid or immedi-
ately notifying the proper authorities.
17 3
Although a statute using a reasonableness standard is
susceptible to varying interpretations, this aspect should with-
stand a vagueness claim because a more specific statement is
not possible. 74 The action required is not capable of exact
guidelines, because it will depend upon the infinite range of
possible factual circumstances. Additionally, as has been
169 Rudzinski explains that in Rumania only the risk of life to the potential res-
cuer excuses his duty, while in Norway, Denmark, Germany, Russia and Belgium, the
duty is abrogated by "serious (or special) danger or sacrifice to the person of the
potential rescuer or other persons." Rudzinski, supra note 163, at 105. "In Portugal
and France intervention is obligatory only when no risk for the rescuer is involved; in
Portugal he apparently need not even risk his property." Id. at 106.
170 See MSA § 604.05(1). This is basically defined so as to not mean in a hospital.
See MSA § 604.05(2).
M See MSA § 604.05(1); VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
172 MSA § 604.05(1).
'73 "The Netherlands, France and Belgium explicitly require either personal in-
tervention or the obtaining of help from other persons." In Italy, Turkey, Rumania
and Russia "the law expressly formulates an alternative duty either to render help or
to inform immediately the proper authority." Rudzinski, supra note 163, at 107-08.
174 This is known as the principle of necessity. Note, supra note 133, at 95.
Under this principle, the loss to the individual, resulting from the "vague" standard,
is balanced against the danger to the public interest associated with a more specific
statement. Id. at 96.
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pointed out, this is no more vague than the concept of negli-
gence under tort law, based on what the "reasonable man"
would have done in that situation.
17 5
A statute of this type should also state who is required to
render aid. Both the Vermont and Minnesota statutes limit
the offense by requiring knowledge that the endangered per-
son is exposed to grave physical harm.17 6 Thus, as with crime
reporting statutes,'17 7 ignorance of the circumstances establish-
ing the duty should be a defense. Vermont imposes the addi-
tional statutory requirement that violation of the statute must
be willful.
78
Other defenses are also recognized by the existing stat-
utes. Both cite danger to the potential rescuer as a defense.
7 9
The Vermont statute also excuses the duty to give assistance
when it would interfere with "important duties owed to
others" or if "that assistance or care is being provided by
others."'180 Other viable common law defenses include mis-
take,' 8 ' lack of capacity, 182 and impossibility. 8 3 Since the
176 See Wechsler & Michael, supra note 148, at 751 n.175 (rule punishing omis-
sions would be "no less specific than the standard of liability for negligent acts").
178 See MSA § 604.05(1); VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
17 See notes 102-10 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of crime re-
porting statutes and the defense of ignorance.
178 See VSA tit. 12, § 519(c). See also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,
394-95 (1933) for discussion of the term "willful." One author states in connection
with the Vermont statute that "[t]he impact of requiring violations to be willful is to
place a heavier burden of proof and persuasion upon the state's attorney." See Note,
supra note 1, at 175. See generally Lawson, supra note 151, at 658-61.
171 See MSA § 604.05(1); VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
180 See VSA tit. 12, § 519(a).
181 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, § 47, at 356-60 for discussion of
mistake negating a requisite mental state. However, mistake will not necessarily pro-
vide a defense for misfeasance. In People v. Young, 210 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. App.
Div.), rev'd, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1962), Mr. Young saw two men seize and wrestle
with a boy. He leaped to the boy's defense and fought with the two men. Id. at 3.
Actually, the two men were detectives effecting an arrest of the boy. Id. Young was
charged with assault, and although the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found in
favor of Young, on the basis of excusable mistake and quashed his conviction, the
New York Court of Appeals reinstated the conviction. 229 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3. For dis-
cussion of this case, see Waller, supra note 8, at 142-44.
182 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 678 ("the ability to do what was not done is
inherent in the concept of negative action"). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 16, § 26, at 188 ("one cannot be criminally liable for failing to do an act
which he is physically incapable of performing"). "A person is not guilty of an offense
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omissions are prohibited under the statutes without regard to
a specific result, there can be no defense predicated on lack of
causation. 84
Finally, both the Vermont 85 and Minnesota'"8 laws have
provisions limiting the civil liability of rescuers. According to
Vermont scholars, this was inserted because of the medical
community's fear of malpractice suits.'8 7 Most states, includ-
ing Kentucky,"" have similar enactments, usually restricting
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is physically capable." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
183 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 16, § 26 at 188-89.
184 For discussions of causation in the context of criminal omissions, see HALL,
supra note 27, at 195-97; Kirchheimer, supra note 9, at 617-20 (The "problem of
causality plays no role when statutes establish a penalty for disobedience regardless
of whether or not undesirable consequences have occurred."). For general analysis of
causation in the criminal law see Lawson, supra note 151, at 686-700.
285 VSA tit. 12, § 519(b) provides:
A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with sub-
section (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts
constitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive
remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law
with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts
committed in the ordinary course of his practice.
,86 MSA § 604.05(2) states:
Any person, including a public or private nonprofit volunteer
firefighter, volunteer police officer, volunteer ambulance attendant, and
volunteer first provider of emergency medical services, who without com-
pensation or the expectation of compensation renders emergency care at
the scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where professional
medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil damages as a result
of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency care unless
that person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in providing the
care. Any person rendering emergency care during the course of regular em-
ployment, and receiving compensation or expecting to receive compensation
for rendering such care, shall be excluded from the protection of this
section.
" See Franklin, supra note 9, at 53-55. See also Note, supra note 1, at 154-60
(discussing legislative history of Vermont statute).
18 The Kentucky good Samaritan statute provides that certain health profes-
sionals are exempt from civil liability for acts performed at the scene of an emer-
gency, unless such acts "constitute willful or wanton misconduct." See KRS § 411.148
(1974 & 1982 Supp.). An opinion of the Kentucky Attorney General states, "KRS
411.148, the 'Good Samaritan Act' is in violation of Ky. Const. § 54 to the extent that
it limits the liability of persons named therein for death or physical injuries caused
by negligent medical treatment rendered without remuneration or the expectation of
it." 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 535 (Oct. 17, 1979).
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liability when aid is given by certain qualified members of the
medical profession-the so-called good Samaritan statutes. 8 9
B. Civil Versus Criminal Liability
Although the language contained in the Minnesota and
Vermont provisions is almost identical, °90 there is a funda-
mental difference: whereas the Vermont statute is criminal,' 9'
the Minnesota statute is civil. 92 However, both laws are inad-
equate because such a statute should contain both civil and
criminal elements. 93
The constitutional provision allegedly violated by the statute states, "The Gen-
eral Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property." Ky. CONST. § 54. Under this
constitutional provision, a Kentucky automobile guest statute limiting recovery of
damages for injuries to cases where intentional wrong of the owner or driver was
demonstrated was held unconstitutional. See Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347, 351
(Ky. 1932).
It has been observed that constitutional challenges to good Samaritan statutes in
other states have not met with success. See Note, supra note 1, at 163 nn.127-29.
Additionally, the opinion of the Attorney General is of questionable validity in light
of the recent Kentucky Supreme Court case of Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky.
1982). This case expresses a deference to legislative judgment, even where certain
claims may be barred as a result. Id. at 41. Applying this reasoning to the Kentucky
good Samaritan provision, it is logical to assume that its constitutional validity would
also be upheld.
' For an excellent appendix containing citation to all the state statutes and
placing these statutes in categories according to location, type of call and immunity
see Note, supra note 1, at 182-83. For a collection of cases arising under the good
Samaritan statutes see Annot., 39 A.L.R.3D 222 (1971). Discussion of these statutes is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Franklin, supra note 9, at 52-53 & nn.8-
15; Norris, Current Status and Utility of Emergency Medical Care Liability Law, 15
FORUM 377 (1979-80); Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964); Note, Good Samaritan Statutes: Time for Uniform-
ity, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 217 (1980-81); Comment, The Good Samaritan and the Law,
32 TENN. L. REv. 287 (1964-65).
190 Compare MSA § 604.05 with VSA tit. 12, § 519. See notes 161-62 supra and
accompanying text for the text of these provisions.
9 ' After a lengthy discussion of whether the Vermont statute is civil or criminal,
one Vermont scholar concludes that the statute is criminal in view of the penalty and
the legislative history. See Note, supra note 1, at 167-70.
192 See note 162 supra.
293 Certain consequences are associated with a statute's civil or criminal charac-
terization. A civil statute will not afford a violator the constitutional due process
rights of a criminal defendant. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTrr, supra note 16, §
4, at 14-21 (discussion of the rudiments of criminal procedure). Further, the civil/
criminal distinction can have a significant impact on the way a complaint is brought.
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A criminal statute is "the core of any regulatory pattern.
It can state the legislature's command most clearly, and its
penalties can be keyed more closely than damages to the grav-
ity of the offense."'19 4 For these reasons, the failure to rescue
others in danger should constitute-at least in part-a public
wrong.' A civil statute giving rise to civil liability is an in-
complete remedy.
However, a statute without any civil component would
also be lacking. 9 ' There are some persuasive arguments
against imposing civil liability; 97 but the possibility of a mon-
etary award is a powerful incentive for an individual to bring
charges in an area where prosecutors may be reluctant to do
so.' 98 Additionally, civil liability can provide an essential de-
terrent to violation and necessary compensation to victims. 99
Vermont's criminal statute is silent as to the possibility of
See Note, supra note 1, at 168 n.155.
194 Franklin, supra note 9, at 55. Moreover, "[a] criminal statute could punish
failures to act even though later events show that rescue efforts would not in fact
have succeeded." Id.
195 All of the European statutes establishing a duty to rescue are criminal in na-
ture. See authorities cited in note 163 supra
196 But see D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 798
(1975-76) (noting the "ease of proof under the criminal statute" and the "greater
sense of duty it would create" as opposed to civil liability). D'Amato has argued
forcefully in favor of a criminal statute imposing a duty of rescue, but against result-
ing civil liability. He states: (1) such a duty derives not from a personal obligation,
but because of interdependence of members of society; (2) the state is "vindicating a
public wrong in addition to the victim's private injury"; (3) there is a "universal self-
interested basis for criminal legislation" because all citizens can envision themselves
in the role of a victim; and (4) prosecutorial discretion safeguards arbitrary and un-
fair prosecutions. Id. at 804-10.
197 See Note, Bad Samaritan, supra note 34, at 640-41 (there are problems of
proving causation and apportioning liability between joint tortfeasors). See also
D'Amato, supra note 196 at 808 ("[Ilmposing tort liability gives a monetary reward to
risk takers and penalizes risk avoiders."). D'Amato also argues: (1) tort liability has
no deterrent effect on judgment proof persons; (2) tort liability is subject to abuse; (3)
no moral reason justifies subjecting persons to liability who did not create the risk of
injury; and (4) "tort liability would operate as an uneven penalty." Id. at 808-09.
" Note, supra note 1, at 180-81.
" Id. "Imposing civil liability would deter violations and compensate victims.
More importantly, civil liability would provide an alternative to burdensome criminal
prosecutions. Without civil liability Section 519 will still protect the good samaritan,
but it is doubtful whether it will compel the reluctant bystander to render assis-
tance." Id. This writer argues that civil liability provides a good supplement to crimi-
nal penalties. See Franklin, supra note 9, at 56; Note, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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resulting tort liability. 00 However, courts could use such a
criminal statute as a statement of legislative policy to adopt a
civil duty.201 This has been done in numerous cases which
were brought under the European criminal statutes. 20 2 Ideally,
a statute should not be totally silent as to the propriety of
civil liability, because courts may conclude that they have no
discretion in the matter. Thus, an appropriate provision could
state that the legislature expresses no opinion as to the desira-
bility of civil liability, and that expansion in this area is solely
within the discretion of the courts.
2 0 3
C. Effectiveness
Even if duty to aid statutes are enacted, there is no guar-
antee that, as a practical matter, they can be effective enough
to accomplish results.20 4 Although initially the Vermont stat-
ute was viewed as landmark legislation, one commentator has
noted that since the statute's enactment in 1967, there has
been only one decision construing it, and no prosecutions
under it. 20 5 However, numerous prosecutions have been re-
20 See VSA tit. 12, § 519. The statute does repudiate any intent to change ex-
isting law regarding "tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts com-
mitted in the ordinary course of his practice." VSA tit. 12, § 519(b).
201 See Franklin, supra note 9, at 56. "The courts might develop a common law
action if the legislature passes a criminal statute but remains silent about civil conse-
quences. . . . Given the legislature's declaration of the existence of a duty to rescue,
courts might readily use that statute, by analogy, to develop a related civil duty." Id.
See also Note, supra note 1, at 145 ("Courts have often used statutes as standards of
conduct to impose civil liability."). See generally Landis, Statutes and the Sources of
the Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934), reprinted in 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 7
(1965); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317 (1913-14);
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401 (1967-
68); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 456 (1948).
For citations to case law on this subject see Note, supra note 1, at 145 n.13.
202 See Rudzinski, supra note 163, at 113.
203 This proposal was suggested by Prof. William Fortune, Professor of Law at
the University of Kentucky. Interview with Prof. Fortune (Nov. 9, 1983).
204 See Miller, Who Saw This Happen?, 69 A.B.A.J. 1208, 1209 (1983) ("These
statutes will be no more effective than jaywalking laws.").
200 See Franklin, supra note 9, at 61 ("On paper, at least, Vermont has made
history, but the statute's practical effect remains to be seen."). Ten years later, an-
other commentator cited the lack of any enforcement of the statute in the fourteen
years since it had been enacted. See Note, supra note 1, at 160-61. One decision has
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ported under the European statutes."' It is thus possible that
a statute establishing a duty to render assistance to others in
danger could be effective, if prosecutorial reluctance could be
overcome.
The unjustifiably low penalties under the Vermont and
Minnesota statutes may contribute to a lack of enforcement.
The maximum sanction under both is a $100 fine.2 07 Such a
meager penalty could be viewed as evidence that the legisla-
ture itself does not take the offense seriously. A higher fine,
combined with a possible prison term, would give a statute
more force and emphasize to prosecutors that the legislature
is concerned enough to back the offense with substantial
penalties.
Additionally, if more states pass criminal statutes, the
power of these laws, as both statements and shapers of public
opinion, will probably convince prosecutors to consider statu-
tory violations more worthy of enforcement.0 8 The Rhode Is-
land experience is encouraging in this regard, as the state in-
stituted a prosecution within months of enacting the crime
reporting statute.2 09
D. Policy Considerations
The basic problem with offenses establishing a duty of
rescue is whether the advantage to be gained in the preven-
tion of crime and apprehension of dangerous persons out-
weighs the threat to individual freedom posed by the imposi-
construed the Vermont statute. See State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981) (stat-
ute did not require intervention in a fight).
206 See Rudzinski, supra note 163, at 102-04; Tunc, supra note 44, at 57-58.
207 See MSA §§ 604.05(1), 609.02(4)(a); VSA tit. 12, § 519(c).
208 Several commentators have noted the power of the law as a shaper of public
attitude. See Gusfield, supra note 4, at 196 ("Laws are statements of public policy
and opinion as well as instruments for courts to implement and police to enforce.");
Tunc, supra note 44, at 44 (expressing the "extraordinary sway of the law as a shaper
of opinion. The law can help to awaken public opinion to the requirements of justice
and even to the requirements of ethics."); Waller, supra note 8, at 141 ("And whether
or not the law leads to direct, individual changes of heart, it at least continues to
serve as a public enunciation of what ought to be done and a public denunciation of
what is considered reprehensible.") (emphasis in original).
209 Telephone interview with Rhode Island State Senator Gloria Kennedy Fleck
(Nov. 16, 1983).
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tion of the duty.2 10 It is contended that morality cannot be
legislated,211 and that attempting to do so will deprive rescue
of its altruistic nature.212 It is further contended that the re-
sponsibility for keeping peace should be exclusively in the po-
lice force,21 3 and that such a duty would violate privacy inter-
ests by encouraging "officious intermeddling. '2 1 4 On the other
210 See Frankel, supra note 14, at 424; Misprision of Felony, supra note 136, at
209 ("The question [is] whether the sacrifice of certain negative freedoms, such as the
freedom not to respond to the crime victim's pleas for help, is worth the attainment
of certain positive freedoms, such as the freedom to live one's life relatively unwor-
ried by crime.").
21' Gregory, supra note 34, at 38-39 ("But I do not see how we can legislate char-
ity, altruism and courage-both physical and moral."). But see Tunc, supra note 44,
at 43 ("It is true that a change in men's hearts cannot be ordered by legislation ...
However, it is the duty of the jurist to bring the law closer to the unequivocal re-
quirements of ethics, when these requirements can be enforced without an unduly
heavy process.").
The objection that "morality cannot be legislated" seems pointless. If one means
by this the way people feel inside cannot be changed by enacting such a statute, then
the purpose of the law has been misinterpreted. If the statement means that moral
obligations cannot be reflected in a legal responsibility, then the fact that the laws
relating to obscenity, prostitution, rape, bigamy and even murder represent just this
kind of legislation, has been forgotten.
212 But see D'Amato, supra note 196, at 805 ("[T]he fact that a majority of the
members of a state might find it in their self-interest to pass such legislation does not
necessarily deprive any smaller class of people of the possibility of moral behavior.").
213 See THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW at ix, xiv (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966) ("Are
we to encourage the ordinary citizen to take direct action in the prevention of crime
or the apprehension of criminals, after centuries of social development clearly point-
ing toward the elimination of vigilante action and the concentration of the responsi-
bility for keeping the peace in the hands of public officials?"). For discussion of the
police attitude toward good Samaritans, see Goldstein, Citizen Cooperation: The Per-
spective of the Police, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 199, 206-07 (J. Ratcliffe
ed. 1966) (refers to failure to cooperate in investigations and prosecutions, and con-
cludes that "[w]e have allowed barriers to develop in our criminal justice system that
frustrate the efforts of those city dwellers who do sense a responsibility to
cooperate.").
214 It has been declared that a statute establishing a duty of rescue would turn a
conscientious citizen into an "intermeddling snoop." See Frankel, supra note 14, at
426. Contra Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW
225 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966) (a line must be drawn "between altruism and meddling" on
the basis of "whether the intending rescuer would reasonably suppose that his help
will be welcome. . . The line will be difficult to draw exactly, but lawyers are pro-
fessional line-drawers.").
Legal articles actually opposing a duty of rescue are scant. See Epstein, A The-
ory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Note, The Duty to Rescue, supra
note 34, at 321. For a philosophical criticism of Epstein, see Weinrib, supra note 3, at
258-79.
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hand, it has been argued that individualistic concerns must be
subordinated to laws for the common benefit,2 15 that the prac-
tical difficulties of such a statute are no more serious than in
other areas of the law,"1 ' and that a legal duty would promote
rescue efforts.
217
These are the policy arguments which the Kentucky legis-
lature would have to confront in deciding whether to enact a
statute imposing some duty to render assistance to strangers.
To gain some indication of what citizens in Lexington, Ken-
tucky, might think about this issue, a question was submitted
for the non-scientific poll at a local television station. The
question was: "Should persons who see a crime be required to
report it to the police?" The response rate was 47.9% "yes"
and 52.1% "no."2 8 Of course, the survey lacks reliability, but
it is interesting to note.
215 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 634 ("evil of interfering with individual liberty
by compelling assistance is much outweighed by the good of preserving human life");
Bad Samaritan, supra note 34, at 639 (persons have a right to have life preserved by
society, and "[f]rom this right appears to proceed the concomitant duty of other men
to rescue, that is, to preserve their neighbor's life in time of peril.").
216 "[E]qually difficult problems in other areas have not dissuaded the courts
from dealing with them and therefore mere complexity does not seem to constitute an
adequate basis for the courts' reluctance to decide these cases." Bad Samaritan,
supra note 34, at 638.
One such practical problem is that of "diffuse responsibility," where there is a
crowd of potential rescuers and everyone fails to act. "[D]iffuse responsibility can be
difficult only if the law refuses to recognize contribution." Rudolph, The Duty to Act:
A Proposed Rule, in THE GOOD SAMARrrAN AND THE LAW 243, 273 (J. Ratcliffe ed.
1966). See Hughes, supra note 14, at 634 (this is no different from situations which
commonly happen in offenses of commission such as riots). See also Frinell, Dahl-
strom & Johnson, supra note 5, at 161 (results of bystander studies demonstrate per-
sons are least likely to give assistance in a crowd because they assume the problem is
not their responsibility).
217 See Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of Research on
Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551 (1979-80). The author concludes:
Research on causes of altruism suggests that an expanded legal duty to aid
may lead to more rescue behavior, primarily because the legal duty would
(1) decrease ambiguity surrounding situations in which help is needed by
providing a rule or norm of what behavior is considered appropriate, and
(2) affect the cost-reward calculus people undertake in deciding whether to
come to another's rescue.
Id. at 561.
218 Results of non-scientific poll conducted by the News Center at WKYT-TV in




If Kentucky were to consider enacting a crime reporting
statute or a statute establishing a duty to render assistance to
persons in danger, the primary concern would be to draft the
laws carefully enough to avoid constitutional attack under the
void for vagueness doctrine. 19A crime reporting statute
should contain a knowledge requirement and should also state
with particularity the following: (1) the crimes which give rise
to the duty to report; (2) the persons who are subject to the
duty; (3) the time period within which witnesses must report
the crime; (4) the order of prosecution; (5) the consequences
of witness cooperation; (6) the available defenses; and (7) the
exceptions to the statute based upon privileged communica-
tions. Additionally, the statute should not leave the decision
to prosecute to the victim's discretion.
A model crime reporting statute might read as follows:
(1) Any person, who knows or has reason to know that a
murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery or arson has been or is
being committed, must notify law enforcement authorities
within 24 hours of learning that such crime has been
committed.
(a) In a prosecution under (1) of this statute, the wit-
ness may be tried before the trial of the accused felon.
(b) For purposes of the reporting requirement under
(1), a victim of rape shall not be considered a witness.
(c) Voluntary testimony for the state by any person vi-
olating the reporting duty under (1) in any prosecution
against the accused felon shall authorize the court to
waive his or her penalty under (f).
(d) Any person making a good faith report pursuant to
this statute shall be exempt from civil liability for acts
which do not constitute gross negligence.
(e) Compliance with (1) is not required in the following
cases: [here list all applicable defenses and privileges].
(f) Violation of the reporting requirement in (1) is pun-
ishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or one year
imprisonment.




In connection with a statute establishing a duty to render
assistance, the legislation should specifically state: (1) when
the duty arises; (2) what degree of risk will abrogate the duty;
(3) what action is required; (4) who must give aid; and (5) any
statutory defenses.
A model statute requiring aid to others in peril might
state:
(1) A person who knows that another is involuntarily in sud-
den and imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death
shall, to the extent that assistance can be rendered without
risk of serious bodily injury or death to himself or herself,
give reasonable assistance to the endangered person unless
that reasonable assistance or care is being provided by
others.
(a) [here insert good Samaritan provision].
(b) Violation of the duty in (1) is punishable by a fine
of up to $1,000 and/or one year imprisonment.
(2) The legislature expresses no opinion as to the desirabil-
ity of civil liability arising from the criminal statute con-
tained in (1), and expansion in this area is solely within the
discretion of the courts.
Susan J. Hoffman
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